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Do South Africa’s Unemployed 






High rates of long-term unemployment pose difficulties for the mapping of the 
class structure.  In South Africa, the high rate of long-term unemployment raises 
the question of whether or not the unemployed constitute a separate class or 
underclass.  An underclass should only be distinguished if it has some 
theoretical foundation (i.e. the members of this class share some systematic 
disadvantage) and empirical consequence (i.e. that membership of this class is 
associated with experiences or attitudes that differ from those associated with 
membership of other classes).  In South Africa, evidence from the mid-1990s 
suggests that, at the end of the apartheid era, one section of the unemployed 
suffered systematic disadvantage in terms of access to employment.  Given that 
people get jobs in South Africa primarily through friends and family, people 
without such social capital are relegated to an especially disadvantaged 
position in the labour market and society in general.  Some but not all of the 
unemployed can be located within an underclass defined in terms of acute 
disadvantage.  The limited evidence available suggests that these unemployed 
people and their dependants constitute an ‘underclass’, experiencing more acute 
poverty, worse living conditions and less satisfaction with their lives than the 
members of other classes (including other unemployed people who do not fall 





The existence of people who are in neither paid employment nor profitable self-
employment has long posed a problem for sociologists mapping the class structure 
of society.  Class schema based on occupation or ownership of the means of 
production cannot easily accommodate retired pensioners, ‘housewives’ or others 
engaged in unpaid domestic work, children, the disabled, single mothers living off 
welfare payments or the unemployed.  Some of these people can be accommodated 
within an orthodox class schema through ‘mediated’ class positions, i.e. they 
derive their class position from other individuals on whom (typically) they are 
directly dependent economically.  Children and non-working spouses thus have 
class positions mediated through the breadwinning household member.  




prior to employment (although, if life expectancy extends significantly longer than 
the age of retirement, this becomes less and less satisfactory).  Thus class positions 
can be found for many people who are not in the economically active population.  
But what about the unemployed?  In societies with very high unemployment, like 
South Africa, the unemployed constitute a huge challenge to analysts of the class 
structure. 
 
In C.S.S.R. Working Paper 31 (Seekings, 2003), I developed several possible class 
schema for South Africa at the end of the apartheid era (using data from the 1993 
P.S.L.S.D. survey).  One class schema seemed preferable on a combination of 
theoretical and empirical grounds. It had both theoretical foundations (in Marxist 
and Weberian theory) and some demonstrable consequentiality, in that there was a 
strong correlation between class and other variables including income, living 
conditions, health, children’s education and certain attitudes. The scheme entailed 
nine classes, which could be combined into seven for simplicity (and these could 
be grouped into three broad clusters, as in Figure 1).  
 
 




              % of              % of 
                                                                               households            income 
         
 
     Upper class           12                45 
        
        
     Semi-prof. class    5 ) 
     Intermediate class 19 )  
     Core working class 19 )   48                45 
     Petty traders   5 ) 
 
     Marginal working class 12 )   41                            10 
     Other   29 ) 
 
 




The ‘upper class’ in Figure 1 comprises three components: an upper class (U.C.) 
defined in terms of managerial and professional occupations together with two 
classes defined in terms of significant income from assets or business activity 
(these were individually labelled ‘W.E.1’ and ‘W.E.2’, with ‘W.E.’ standing for 




terms of teaching and nursing occupations.  The ‘intermediate class’ (I.C.) is 
defined in terms of routine white-collar, skilled and supervisory occupations.  The 
‘core working class’ (C.W.C.) is defined in terms of semi-skilled and unskilled 
occupations, excepting in domestic and agricultural work which are categorised 
separately as the ‘marginal working class’ (M.W.C.).  Petty traders (W.E.3) are 
defined in terms of a low income from business, typically n the informal sector.  
The final ‘class’ was a residual category, which we labelled unimaginatively as the 
‘other’ class.  
 
This class schema entails giving each household a uniform class location, reflecting 
the occupation of the breadwinner or the level of household income from assets or 
business. There are, therefore, many unemployed in classes such as the 
intermediate, core working- and marginal working-classes (I.C., C.W.C. and 
M.W.C.). But many other unemployed people live in households with nobody 
working (or in lucrative self-employment), and thus fall into the residual, ‘other’ 
category.  Is it right to divide up unemployed people like this?  And might 
households including unemployed people in the ‘other’ class be distinguished from 
households that do not include unemployed people (for example, that include only 
retired pensioners)?   
 
This Working Paper examines whether households without members in 
employment but with unemployed members can usefully be considered as a 
discrete class, perhaps (to use more controversial vocabulary) an ‘underclass’? 
Most social scientific writings on this question in South Africa adopt the approach 
that these unemployed are really just displaced workers: workers and the 
unemployed are all parts of the ‘the working class as a whole’ (to quote Gelb and 
Webster, 1996: 74). An implication of this approach is that unemployed and 
employed African people share a common position in the social structure, are 
similarly disadvantaged, and share similar interests (see also Adler and O’Sullivan, 
1996; Adler and Webster, 1999).  
 
This approach underestimates the importance of both actual employment and 
prospective access to employment in conferring advantage (or, if one prefers, 
mitigating disadvantage). The number of employed and unemployed members in 
a household has an important bearing on where the household is located in the 
income distribution. Households with two or more working members are 
concentrated in the top income deciles, whereas those with no members in 
employment are amongst the poorest of the poor. Precise gradations in access to 
the labour market clearly matter a great deal. It is correct that some workers, 
especially in the marginal working class (i.e. farm-workers, domestic workers and 
their dependants), are not much higher in terms of income distribution than 




class is predominantly African, the income gap between African households in 
worker-less households and those in the marginal working class is not as great as 
that between the average unemployed household and the average employed 
household. However, to categorise the entire African workforce – whether 
employed or unemployed, unionised or not, as ‘under-privileged’ (as do Adler and 
O’Sullivan, 1996: 181-2) – misses crucial distinctions.  
 
Unemployed people are disadvantaged relative to employed people. Yet when it 
comes to providing the unemployed with a class location, the unemployed need 
to be differentiated.  There are good reasons for locating many but not all of the 
unemployed in a class of their own, in a class that we might label as the 
underclass.  The reasons for delineating an underclass comprising some of the 
unemployed (and their dependants) are related to the ways in which labour 
markets work in South Africa. Amidst a scarcity of jobs, access to employment 
opportunities can itself be a scarce resource. The unemployed are differentiated 
by uneven access to employment opportunities. An underclass should be defined 
not simply as including people who lack employment, but more specifically as 
including people who are excluded from access to employment opportunities (or 
at least are very disadvantaged in terms of such access).  Using data from 1993, 
backed up with more recent data, I argue that the apartheid state bequethed an 
‘underclass’ to post-apartheid South Africa, in that economic and social 
conditions created an especially disadvantaged class.  
 
 
2. Theorising the Underclass 
 
In the 1980s, the concept of the ‘underclass’ came to be used widely in the U.S.A. 
and Europe to refer to categories of people who were not working. The popular 
usage of the term was driven primarily by the writings of conservatives, especially 
Charles Murray. Murray wrote about both the U.S.A. (1984) and U.K. (1990). He 
attributed the existence of an underclass to a distinctive sub-culture (entailing 
criminality and an aversion to waged work), which in turn was attributed to social 
disintegration and the provision of public welfare. The class was thus defined 
primarily by a mix of attitudinal and behavioural characteristics. What unified the 
category was the perception that welfare-dependants, the long-term unemployed, 
the ghetto poor and the criminal, were all, in some sense, outside of the social, 
economic or political institutions of civilised society.  
 
This use of the concept of the underclass is invoked for South Africa by Adam 
(1997), who writes of ‘the moral decay and the growing impoverishment of an 




responsible for crime and represents the ‘number one problem for long-term 
stability’ in South Africa (Adam, 1997: 2).  South African society certainly 
exhibits many of the characteristics that underpin conservatives’ use of the 
‘underclass’ concept: crime, unemployment, teenage pregnancies and the 
disintegration of families and communities.  The only obviously missing ingredient 
is welfare-dependency, as South Africa’s public welfare system only provides 
generous benefits to groups (the elderly and disabled especially) who are unable to 
work. 
 
An alternative approach to the ‘underclass’ starts not with supposed attitudes and 
behaviour but in class theory.  If class is defined in terms of exploitation, where in 
the class structure do we locate people who are not exploited because they do not 
work?  They certainly do not fit nearly into any of the orthodox class categories. 
The neo-Marxist scholar Wright (1997) suggests that the unemployed constitute an 
underclass that is oppressed but not exploited.  But, as his concern is with the 
working population only rather than society as a whole, he does not elaborate.  The 
Weberian scholar Runciman (1990) similarly suggests that, if class is defined in 
terms of ownership, authority or expertise, then there are good grounds for 
delineating an underclass in British (or American) society. 
 
The task of locating the unemployed in the class structure requires that we first 
reconsider what are the purposes of class analysis in general.  Where economists 
are happy to understand inequality in terms of individuals’ attributes (with, for 
example, the probability of poverty being related to geographical location, 
education, experience, race, etc), sociologists seek to locate individuals in the 
social structure as members of identified social groups or classes. Inequality is thus 
the subject of class analysis. There are three major reasons for this.  Firstly, class 
analysis might be of simply heuristic value. For many of us, it is easier to 
conceptualise positions in the income distribution in terms of classes than of 
attributes. This kind of class ‘analysis’ is primarily descriptive. Secondly, class 
analysis may be driven by theory, generally derived from the work of Marx. But, as 
Wright – the pre-eminent neo-Marxist scholar of the 1990s – puts it, any such use 
of class is ‘simply an arbitrary convention’ (Wright, 1997). Thirdly, class analysis 
may be driven by the consequential importance of class categories, i.e. by the 
consequences of individuals’ positions in the class structure for other social and 
political phenomena.  Class analysis generally entails maintaining a balance 
between the second and third concerns: Class categories should be theoretically 
grounded but must also exhibit some ‘consequentiality’ for class analysis to be 
anything more than a theological exercise (see further Seekings, 2003). 
 
Class may be consequential in two ways. First, classes may reproduce themselves 




or between generations. Of course, low rates of inter-class mobility raise the 
question of ‘why?’, leading to analyses of household decision-making about 
education, for example, as well as access to employment or other income-
generating opportunities. Secondly, classes may be consequential in terms of 
specific phenomena, such as voting behaviour. Freed from the straitjackets of 
theoretical orthodoxy, sociologists and political scientists are showing that ‘class 
counts’ – as Wright proclaims in the title of his recent study of the United States 
(1997). The boundaries around classes remain relatively impermeable with respect 
to marriage and friendship patterns, and to individual and inter-generational 
mobility; class also counts (albeit less consistently across national borders) with 
respect to attitudes (Wright, 1997). Class continues to play an important part in 
politics, including in voting (Evans, 1999).  The final sections of Working Paper 
31 examined various ways in which class (as set out in Figure 1 above) is 
consequential in South Africa. 
 
Any class analysis requires some prior conceptualisation of the class structure. 
When Wright argues that ‘class counts’, he means that the class analysis he 
develops, on broadly Marxist foundations, generates class positions that help to 
explain other social and political phenomena. His class categories are not defined, 
however, by their consequences. To do so would be to reduce class analysis to a set 
of tautologies. Fortunately, there has been a convergence between scholars to the 
practice of mapping classes in society. There is little difference between 
approaches of the neo-Marxist Wright and the neo-Weberian Goldthorpe. Both use 
broadly similar occupational categories to map the class structures of advanced 
capitalist societies. Both therefore also run into the problem of classifying people 
without occupations. As Wright puts it, ‘the empirical categories of analysis are 
underdetermined by the theoretical frameworks within which they are generated or 
interpreted’ (1997: 37). 
 
The most influential studies of the underclass are those that have combined some 
theoretical foundation with an analysis of consequence.  The eminent American 
sociologist William Julius Wilson (1987, 1991, 1996) used the concept of the 
‘underclass’ (at least until he grew alarmed by its conservative connotations in the 
U.S.A.) to describe a distinctive group of people who suffer systematic and 
cumulative disadvantage in the labour and other markets. ‘What distinguishes 
members of the underclass from those of other economically disadvantaged groups 
is that their marginal economic position or weak attachment to the labour force is 
uniquely reinforced by the neighborhood or social milieu’ (1991: 474). Wilson is 
saying that some people on the edge or outside of the orthodox class structure are 
especially disadvantaged, such that disadvantage and marginality are reproduced 
over time.  Wilson himself emphasises the roots of disadvantage in changing 




segregation (Massey & Denton, 1993).  Whatever the precise mix of racial and 
other factors, it is clear that growing up in a ghetto neighbourhood in many 
American cities raises considerably the chances of dropping out of school, failing 
to find work, having children whilst still a teenager, and thereafter being a single 
parent. 
 
Disadvantage is cumulative in part because of the isolation of the underclass from 
the rest of society.  As Massey and Denton put it, ‘residents of hypersegregated 
neighborhoods necessarily live within a very circumscribed and limited social 
world’: 
 
‘They rarely travel outside of the black enclave, and most have few 
friends outside of the ghetto.  This lack of connection to the rest of 
society carries profound costs, because personal contacts and friendship 
networks are among the most important means by which people get 
jobs.’ (Massey & Denton, 1993: 161). 
 
In the U.S.A., spatial and social isolation breed distinct speech patterns and 
language and an oppositional culture that in turn serve to reinforce isolation and 
disadvantage.   
 
In the U.K., discussion of an ‘underclass’ has focused on the long-term 
unemployed.  Detailed research on the long-term unemployed shows how 
disadvantage can be cumulative:  
 
‘As well as being deprived of work they were disadvantaged in health 
and housing. They became involved in local social networks consisting 
primarily of other people without work and employment. This ensured 
that they had lower levels of social support and tended to lock them into 
a position of labour market disadvantage ... [P]eople may be caught in a 
spiral of disadvantage in which small events may have large 
repercussions. Through an initial accident of job loss, a person may get 
trapped in a cycle of further unemployment. Unemployment frequently 
leads to depression, family break-up, and social isolation, which in turn 
makes the next job more difficult to find’ (Gallie and Marsh, 1994: 29-
30). 
 
In this view, location in the underclass is consequential. Individuals are not simply 
temporarily displaced workers – i.e. temporarily out of other classes – but are 
locked into a class trajectory that leads away from rather than back to other classes. 
Research in Britain, however, suggests that long-term unemployment is not 




social, economic and political issues) (Devine, 1997: 241-254, Gallie, 1994; 
Marshall et al., 1996). Taking the long-term unemployed as a whole, the attitudinal 
differences between them and working people in Britain are not sufficient to 
consider them as a separate class; rather, they appear to be displaced members of 
the working class. 
 
The factors that contribute to systematic disadvantage on the margins or outside of 
orthodox class categories vary between societies.  In the advanced capitalist 
democracies of the North, states also vary in the ways they structure and address 
disadvantage, for example through labour market policies.  The study of 
unorthodox class categories needs to be informed by the specific character of the 
society in question, rather than derived from some overarching theory. 
 
 
3. Unemployment in South Africa 
 
Unemployment is extraordinarily high in South Africa by any measure.  The most 
appropriate measure of unemployment in the South African context is the broad or 
expanded measure.  This includes not only people who are actively looking for 
work but also ‘discouraged jobseekers’, i.e. people who want work but do not 
actively look for it because, they say, there are no jobs to look for.  For many 
unemployed people in some parts of South Africa, job search is indeed futile.  
Using this broad definition, the South African unemployment rate is almost 40 
percent (see Nattrass, 2000c, for evidence and debates over the definition of 
unemployment). 
 
Unemployment is very high in South Africa for two sets of reasons.  First, 
economic growth has been too weak to absorb the ever rising number of young 
men and women entering the labour market, itself due to demographic growth and 
rising participation rates.  Secondly, the policies and actions of government, 
organised labour and business have together resulted in a growth path that has been 
‘jobless’ in that employment has fallen despite economic growth.  Crucially, the 
growth path has entailed rising productivity and rising wages for an ever smaller 
pool of workers, with rapid shrinkage in, especially, unskilled employment 
opportunities (see Nattrass, 2001; Seekings & Nattrass, forthcoming). 
 
Almost one half of the unemployed are in households with other members in 
employment, and almost one tenth are in households with significant income from 
entrepreneurial activities or assets. But this leaves half of the unemployed living in 
households that cannot be categorised in orthodox terms. About one half of the 




The other half have nobody in the labour force: their adult members are either 
retired, sick or disabled, or home-workers not wanting employment. Table 1 shows 
the composition of each class by working or employment status, and Figure 2 
shows the participation and unemployment rates for each class. 
 
Table 1.  Working status by class (South Africa, 1993)  
 

























Employed 17 66 28 49 52 13 46 50 0 34 
Self-
employed 
25 3 18 3 3 19 3 2 6 5 
Un- 
employed 
8 6 8 12 12 19 16 18 27 17 
Not in the 
Labour 
force 
50 24 45 36 33 48 36 30 67 42 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
 
Note: WE1-3 are the ‘wealth and entrepreneurship classes’; UC is the upper class; 
SPC the semi-professional class; IC the intermediate class; CPC the core working 




























Unemployment is not only widespread in South Africa, but it is also very often 
long-term.  If unemployment was a transitory phenomenon then it might make 
sense to ignore it when locating individuals and households in the class structure. 
The unemployed might rather be classified according to their past or prospective 
future occupations, i.e. by what Wright terms their ‘class trajectory’ (1997: Ch. 
16). Thus a temporarily unemployed teacher is a displaced teacher, not a member 
of an underclass. All available evidence in South Africa suggests, however, that 
unemployment is unusually long-term in duration. 
 
The 1993 P.S.L.S.D. survey did not ask about duration of unemployment, but 
successive October Household Surveys did. Bhorat and Leibbrandt (1996: 146) 
found, using the 1994 October Household Survey, that 17 percent of the 
unemployed had been unemployed for up to six months, 15 percent for between six 
and twelve months, and a massive 68 percent for more than 12 months.  
 
Unemployment in South Africa is longer in duration than in other countries for 
which we have data. In those European countries that are part of the O.E.C.D., 
about 66 percent of the unemployed have been unemployed for more than six 
months, compared to 83 percent in South Africa. In O.E.C.D. Europe, about 48 
percent of the unemployed have been unemployed for more than one year, 
compared to about 68 percent in South Africa. Only a few countries have long-
term unemployment rates similar to South Africa’s. In Italy and Ireland, over 80 
percent of the unemployed have been out of work for at least six months, and two-
thirds have been unemployed for twelve months or more. But in these countries the 
overall unemployment rate is much lower than in South Africa. It should also be 
remembered that the long-term unemployed in South Africa do not have access to 
welfare benefits, which are often generous in Europe (O.E.C.D., 1999: 224, 242). 
 
In South Africa, not only have most unemployed been without work for a long 
time, but most report that they have never worked. Bhorat and Leibbrandt (1996: 
150) report that 65 percent say they had no previous occupation (If we look at the 
previous jobs of the one-third who had worked before, about 20 percent had had 
jobs putting them into our core or marginal working class categories, about 12 
percent had had intermediate class jobs and about 2 percent had had semi-
professional or upper class jobs – according to our best guess with respect to 
reclassifying the categories provided by Bhorat and Leibbrandt). Such a high 
proportion of the unemployed had never worked before because many of them had 
gone straight from school into unemployment (ibid: 147-8). The 1995 October 
Household Survey paints much the same picture: 69 percent of the unemployed 
had never worked, and the proportion was highest for younger unemployed. As 
many as 89 percent of the unemployed aged between 16 and 20 had never worked; 




to and including 31-35 year-olds; even among older unemployed, as many as half 
had never worked (Klasen and Woolard, 1998: 33). 
 
Other studies present similar findings. Moller (1992) found that 60 percent of the 
unemployed had been looking for over one year, and the median duration of 
unemployment was between one and two years (quoted in Kruger, 1995: 49-50). In 
Port Elizabeth in 1989, 57 percent of unemployed African people had been 
unemployed for over two years (Riordan, 1992: 79-80). A survey of sixteen- to 
thirty-year-olds in 1992 found that ‘30% have been out of work for one year, 21% 
have been out of work for two years, and a further 15% have been unemployed for 
three years’ (CASE, 1993: 14). The same study put the unemployment rate for this 
age-group at 52 percent (ibid: 14).  
 
Standing et al., however, are sceptical about this data on the duration of 
unemployment. 
 
‘When one finds large numbers of people aged in their 20s and 30s 
reporting that they have never had a job, one wonders what they have 
been doing for the past five or ten years. Perhaps what they mean by a 
job is not the same as what the survey designers mean by it ... [M]any of 
the job-seekers may perceive that the work they had been doing did not 
constitute a ‘proper job’ and therefore report to the enumerator that they 
had never held a job or that they had been out of employment for a 
longer time than if their unemployment was measured from the time 
when they last worked for pay, profit or family gain’ (Standing et al, 
1996: 124-5). 
 
Some or even many people in marginal forms of income-earning activity probably 
do not regard the work they do as a proper job. However, this does not mean that 
measured unemployment rates are substantially incorrect: those who report 
themselves as unemployed, but who then admit to any other forms of income 
earning activities, are typically reclassified as employed. Moreover, even if the 
Standing et al critique was true, the implication for class categorisation is hardly 
clear. It is unlikely that many could be classified in occupational class categories 
on the basis of former casual or part-time employment. Most, we imagine, would 
have to be classified as former members of the ‘petty trader’ (W.E.3) class – and 
then only if their income was sufficient. 
 
We might consider the unemployed to be members of occupationally-defined 
classes on the basis of their prospective future employment. Without panel studies 
of employment histories, we have no data to enable us to even attempt this. Even if 




people according to their future position in the social structure. Should we classify 
an unskilled worker as intermediate class if we know that he’ll be promoted to 
supervisor sometime in the future? Should we classify a domestic worker as a 
semi-professional if we know that she will work as a teacher sometime in the 
future? It is clearly important to understand patterns of individual and inter-
generational mobility, but there are also clear problems involved in classifying 
people today according to their position in the social structure in five years’ time, 
or even one year’s time. The duration of unemployment is presumably crucial here. 
 
 
4. Who Gets Jobs? Identifying the ‘Truly    
    Disadvantaged’ in South Africa 
 
‘The unemployed are not a homogeneous group’, as Bhorat and Leibbrandt (1996) 
remind us.  Some experience systematic disadvantage than others.  At any one 
time, some of the unemployed have not been unemployed for long and some will 
not remain unemployed for long.  They might well be considered temporarily 
displaced workers.  In a few cases, they might even be ‘choosing’ to be 
unemployed in the sense that they could find employment but prefer to wait and 
look for a more desirable job.  Many, however, are long-term unemployed.  
 
Kingdon (1999) summarises some of the differences between the long-term and 
short-term unemployed. Their household per capita income is as much as one-third 
lower, on average. The proportion below fixed poverty lines is higher. They have 
less education, are more likely to be African, and are less likely to live in urban 
areas. They typically have fewer amenities (such as a toilet, running water and 
electricity) at home, and the roads to where they live are likely to be impassable at 
certain times of the year.   
 
The duration of unemployment might contribute to disadvantage.  As the duration 
of unemployment lengthens, so people may become less employable (i.e. less 
attractive to employers) or they may lost the capacity to seek or secure 
employment.  But the duration of unemployment is also the product of other, 
underlying causes of disadvantage, including especially differential links to 
employment opportunities. Some people are more likely to experience long-term 
(or indefinite) unemployment than others in part because they are already in a 
much more marginal position in the labour market.  
 
Another source of systematic disadvantage is the human capital of the 
unemployed.  Bhorat (2000) has argued that some of the unemployed are 




market today.  Among the older unemployed are many people who lack any 
secondary education.  Typically they used to work on the mines or farms, but were 
retrenched, and now live in rural areas.  The decline in demand for unskilled labour 
means, according to Bhorat, that these men and women are unlikely ever to find 
permanent employment.  Until we have better longitudinal (and especially panel) 
data on labour market participation, it is difficult to assess the true extent of 
‘unemployability’. 
 
A further source of systematic disadvantage is the social capital of the 
unemployed. If unemployed people get jobs primarily through connections and 
networks, then their connections constitute a specific kind of social capital.  
Again, the absence of panel data makes it difficult to assess the significance of 
networks, but there is considerable evidence from a range of sources suggesting 
that people find jobs and employers fill vacancies through informal networks. 
Erasmus (1999: 59) found, in a survey of 2000 unemployed people in six 
provinces, that ‘most relied on their family and friends who were employed to 
inform them of vacancies and/or put in a good word for them with their 
employers’. Standing et al. (1996: 323) report that only 26 percent of 
manufacturing firms fill vacancies through advertising. Only 7 percent employ 
people who had applied directly at the factory gate. Thirteen percent said that they 
hire former employees, and 41 percent said they hire the friends and relatives of 
existing workers. Employers rely on informal channels in part because they face 
huge numbers of equally ‘qualified’ potential applicants: ‘The “formal” 
qualifications (notably the matric school leaving certificate) cease to be of value in 
a context in which there are literally tens of thousands of applicants who all share 
these qualifications’ (Wittenberg, 1999). Indeed, Wittenberg and Pearce (1996) 
show, education is a poor predictor of the probability of employment. 
 
This level of ‘internal’ recruitment does not have a long history in South Africa.  
Under apartheid, huge effort was put into the bureaucratic allocation of black 
labour through pass laws, the administrative institutions of labour bureaux, 
magistrates and administration boards, and the coercive institutions of the police 
and courts. Manufacturing employers appear to have been the first to circumvent 
this system. McCartan (1984) interviewed forty-three large and medium-sized 
firms in the Port Elizabeth and East London metropolitan areas, and found that a 
considerable degree of internal recruitment of skilled and semi-skilled workers and 
supervisors. He found that unskilled workers were often recruited by ‘word of 
mouth’, thus extending a screening process to the entire labour market.  The mines, 
farms and state seem to have persisted with the administrative system for longer, 
especially for unskilled labour (Greenberg & Giliomee, 1985).  African people 
have long sought to circumvent controls – hence the large number of prosecutions 




broke down, replaced by a ‘free’ but inegalitarian labour market.  Stratification by 
ownership of human, social or other capital has replaced stratification by legal 
status under the pass laws. 
 
Survey data from the 1990s indicates how fast labour markets changed.  If 
employers were filling vacancies through the networks formed around their 
existing workers, then we might expect that the employment status of other 
members of the household would be a powerful predictor of employment.  
Wittenberg found that this was the case. The unemployment rate was much higher, 
for example, among the wives of unemployed men than among the wives of 
employed men. Among people who lived with their parents, unemployment was 
much higher among those with unemployed parents than among those whose 
parents worked (Wittenberg, 1999). Wittenberg came to the ‘uncomfortable 
conclusion’ that ‘employment and unemployment do tend to cluster in households’ 
(ibid). 
 
Further evidence of the importance of networks is supplied by Samson et al (2000: 
13). They report that there is a strong correlation between living standards prior to 
finding a job and the prospect of finding a job. Unemployed people living in high 
income households have a much better chance of securing employment than 
unemployed people living in low income households. Samson et al seem to suggest 
that the success rate in the top income quintile is four times as high as that in the 
bottom quintile. 
 
Another aspect of the importance of networks was illustrated in a report in the 
union-based South African Labour Bulletin.  A die-casting factory on the East 
Rand, like most employers, filled most vacancies word of mouth, with existing 
workers telling family members. But unemployed people protested against this 
‘nepotism’, forcing the employer to recruit by open lot.  Six thousand unemployed 
gathered outside the factory gates, to participate in some kind of a lottery for about 
one hundred vacancies.  Tragically, eight were shot dead in a ‘drive-by’ shooting. 
The shooting, according to Harvey, was the result of rivalry between two unions 
within the factory, with each seeking to control who was appointed (Harvey, 
1996).  In an economy where jobs are scarce, access to employment is an important 
resource, and control over that access warrants fighting – and killing.  Unions seek 
to control new appointments, and this undoubtedly serves to advantage those 
unemployed who are linked to people already in employment and to disadvantage 
those who have no such links. Other employers, such as Toyota, operate a pool 
system whereby vacancies are filled by former employees or the family members 
of current employees. It is surely the case that the number of discouraged 
unemployed in South Africa is large, in part because vacancies are so often filled 




some with good prospects for employment and others with poor prospects, and that 
the former are more likely to be members of mixed working/unemployed 
households. 
 
Access to employment opportunities presumably reflects some combination of 
location and social capital.  In some areas, there are so few job opportunities that 
social capital does not count for very much in terms of finding employment 
locally.  But, in the South African labour market, where an unemployed person 
is located is in part the product of other factors. Klasen and Woolard (1998: 21-
2) point to the interconnectedness of factors in arguing that the unemployed 
comprise two groups: 
 
‘The one with bleaker job prospects, better access to resources in rural 
areas (pensions, land etc), little connections in urban areas and deterred 
by the high costs of urban living, and possibly less motivation remains in 
rural areas or goes to rural areas to attach themselves to a household of 
parents and relatives. It then does not engage in search activities and thus 
ends up among the broad (expanded) unemployed. The second group, 
with better job prospects, less access to resources in rural areas, better 
connections in urban areas, and possibly more motivation, attaches 
themselves to a household of parents or relatives in urban areas and then 
searches for employment’. 
 
Unemployed people are likely to divide into two different categories: discouraged 
job-seekers who remain in (or return to) the rural areas and active job-seekers in (or 
who move to) the towns. 
 
There is evidence of the importance of social capital to the unemployed in finding 
employment in distant parts of the country.  Many rural people found employment 
as migrant workers through ‘homeboy networks’; even in the early 1990s, such 
networks resulted in people from certain villages being employed in specific firms. 
Sperber found that a high proportion of migrant workers from one village in the 
Ciskei were employed in two specific dairies in Cape Town and Port Elizabeth 
(1993: 35-6). By contrast, those rural dwellers without good connections in the 
cities are likely to be marginalised. Simkins (1978) reported that migrant workers 
returned to the rural areas because they lacked contacts in the towns. Unemployed 
people in Phuthaditjhaba (the old QwaQwa Bantustan) say that they do not move 
to the cities in search of work because they do not know anyone they could stay 
with (Nattrass, 2000a). Baber (1999) found that networks were crucial to 
employment prospects in the Northern Province. ‘Many of those who were resident 
in the rural settlements throughout the twelve-month study period were waiting for 




market’ (204). Baber found that men from one village were more successful in 
securing semi-skilled employment than men in a second village, despite being less 
educated, in part because they were ‘able to draw on well developed migrant 
networks’ that were largely absent in the other village (ibid: 216). He concludes 
that the South African labour market comprises ‘a protected group of “insiders” 
and a considerably worse-off group of residual “outsiders”’, trapped in 
unemployment or in low-paid, unskilled jobs with high rates of turnover (ibid: 219-
20). 
 
Social capital thus comes in different forms.  In some parts of the country, social 
capital might be primarily intra-household, if access to employment opportunities 
is dependent on other household members who have jobs.  In other parts of the 
country, social capital will take the form of links to friends and relatives who are 
not only outside the household but may well be in distant parts of the country.  The 
unemployed who remain in rural areas (especially rural areas in the Eastern Cape 
and Northern Province) where there are few job opportunities are probably the 
unemployed who lack the social capital to escape the constraints of location. 
 









A household member told me about the job 15 9 10 
A household member got me the job at their 
workplace 
4 4 4 
A friend/relative (in a different household) told me 
about the job 
35 33 35 
A friend/relative (in a different household) got me 
the job at their workplace 
10 12 10 
I responded to a newspaper advertisement 4 6 9 
I went to a factory and waited outside until I got the 
job 
12 13 10 
I knocked on factory gates and visited private 
homes and shops until I got the job 
10 10 8 
I got the job through an employment agency 3 3 3 
I waited on the side of the road until I got a job 1 1 0 
I found the job on a notice board in a community 
centre, shopping centre, etc 
0 0 1 
Other 6 7 12 





The only detailed recent data on the importance of social capital in the labour 
market comes from the Khayelitsha/Mitchell’s Plain Survey (K.M.P.S.) conducted 
in late 2000 in African and coloured residential areas in Cape Town.  A survey in 
metropolitan Cape Town only captures patterns in one, atypical corner of the 
labour market.  A fuller understanding requires similar data from rural areas.  And 
a single cross-sectional survey cannot provide the kind of data that a panel study 
would generate.  Nonetheless, the survey confirms the importance of social capital 
in securing employment.  Table 2 shows that almost two-thirds of the people who 
had had a job said that they got their first job through friends or family.  Almost as 
high a proportion of people got their current job through friends or family, or got 
their ‘previous’ job (i.e. their job preceding their current job, or their most recent 
job if currently unemployed) the same way.  Table 2 suggests that, for people 
working in Cape Town, friends or relatives in different households are more 
important than members of the same household.  In the same survey respondents 
were asked whether they agreed with the statement ‘employers employ the friends 
and relatives of their existing workforce rather than other people’.  Thirty-eight 
percent agreed, and 43 percent agreed strongly; hardly anyone disagreed.   
 
Unemployed respondents were asked whether they had ‘employed friends or 
family members who say that they may be able to find you work at their 
workplaces’.  Almost equal proportions said ‘yes’ and ‘no’ (47 percent versus 53 
percent), indicating that even in this urban area the unemployed do not report equal 
social capital.  The unemployed with this social capital report a slightly longer 
duration of unemployment, on average, but this means little in the absence of 
controls for age, date of entry into the labour market and so on.  Much more 
revealingly, the unemployed with social capital were much more optimistic about 
finding employment than the unemployed without social capital (see Table 3).  The 
proportion of unemployed with social capital who think that there is a realistic 
possibility of finding a job within the next month was twice as high as the 





Table 3.  Expected chances of finding employment, according to whether 









% saying yes % saying yes 
… the next month? 43 22 
… the next three    
     months? 58 37 
… the next six  
     months? 64 47 
Do you think there 
is a realistic 
possibility that 
you will get a job 
in … 
… the next year? 71 56 
 
Unsurprisingly, unemployed people with social capital were much more likely than 
those without to have used networks to try to find work.  More interestingly, 
unemployed people with social capital were also more likely to have looked in 
newspapers. 
 
We also asked whether respondents agreed that ‘people who have had jobs before 
have a better chance of getting a job than someone who has never had a job 
before’.  Responses were similarly positive (with 44 percent agreeing and 36 
percent agreeing strongly).  The data indicates clearly that people in these areas not 
only get jobs primarily through networks but also perceive the labour market as 
favouring people with contacts and previous work experience. 
 
A final factor contributing to systematic disadvantage is a lack of financial capital. 
 Financial capital can assist an unemployed person in escaping unemployment by 
facilitating job search (including movement to locations where there are more job 
opportunities) or by making it possible to set up a small business, whether formal 
or informal.  In the K.M.P.S., 78 percent of the unemployed said that they had not 
become self-employed because they lacked the money to start a business, and a 
further 3 percent said that they were unable to borrow money. 
 
 
5. Measuring Disadvantage among the  
    Unemployed 
 
There are theoretical and empirical grounds for identifying six possible factors 
underpinning or associated with special disadvantage in the labour market.  These 




others to a different section; alternatively, different factors might combine for any 
one group of unemployed.  The factors are: 
 
• unemployability, in terms of lack of skills: even if unemployment affects the 
highly-schooled as well as the unschooled, the lack of (say) secondary 
education might well preclude most employment; 
• a lack of social capital, in terms of living in a household where no one has the 
connections to help secure a job; 
• a lack of social capital, in terms of having no friends or relatives (in other 
households, perhaps some distance away) who can help to access employment 
opportunities;   
• a lack of financial capital, preventing the unemployed becoming self-employed;  
• location, in terms of the availability of local jobs in relation to job-seekers and 
the distance from other locations where the prospects of securing employment 
are better; 
• the duration of unemployment, insofar as it contributes to unemployability in 
ways other than the above. 
 
Optimally, we would be able to measure these different criteria and assess the 
extent to which they overlap (using a single data-set), and then examine the 
relationships between them – individually and collectively – and exits from 
unemployment (using panel data).  Having established a good measure of 
disadvantage, we would then compare this with some of the other consequences of 
class, such as attitudes or political behaviour, living conditions and social 
relationships, health and so on.   
 
This ideal cannot presently be achieved.  Attempts have been made to measure 
each of these factors, albeit somewhat experimentally in the case of the social 
capital questions (with the K.M.P.S. asking about ‘employed friends or family 
members who say they may be able to find you work at their workplaces’).  But 
there is no data-set that covers the whole set of factors, with a sample from both 
rural and urban areas, and can link these adequately to exits from unemployment, 
yet alone to other social and political phenomena.  The P.S.L.S.D. did not ask 
about the duration of unemployment.  The K.M.P.S. does not cover any rural area. 
Surveys that provide data on the duration of unemployment and household 
employment patterns (such as the Labour Force Surveys) generally do not ask 
adequate questions about social capital, and do not allow for a full construction of 
social class positions.  As with the study of class in South Africa in general (see 
Seekings, 2003), we are forced to take short-cuts. 
To use existing countrywide household survey data such as the P.S.L.S.D., we 
must concentrate on one key factor.  The P.S.L.S.D. data allows us to measure 




household.  We can divide the unemployed into two separate categories: 
unemployed people living in households where another household member is 
working (i.e. with social capital) and those living in households where no one is 
working (i.e. without social capital).  Because the P.S.L.S.D. defines the 
‘household’ as including people who live in the homestead or stand for as little as 
fifteen days out of the past year, this definition of social capital covers many 
connections to family members who are migrant workers elsewhere in the country. 
 This measure of social capital does not capture links to family and friends living 
permanently in other households, including family members who live elsewhere 
and remit income but never return to the homestead. 
 
Further research can be done using existing data on the relationships between pairs 
of these factors.  Education has already been compared with the duration of 
unemployment (e.g. Bhorat, 2000) – although more care needs to be taken in the 
analysis of people who have not been unemployed for long, as they might be either 
‘temporarily unemployed’ or simply people who have only recently left school 
or been retrenched but will remain unemployed for a long time.  The Labour 
Force Survey can be used to compare the duration of unemployment with 
household composition or what we might call the ‘household unemployment rate’ 
(i.e. the proportion of adults wanting work who are working).  The P.S.L.S.D. and 
other surveys can be used to expand the measure of social capital, for example to 
include links to people in other households such as people who regularly remit 
income. But the key questions can only be asked using data that does not currently 
exist. 
 
Lacking such detailed data, we can only be tentative. But the available data does 
seem to suggest that we can identify an underclass of unemployed, comprising 
those unemployed (and the other members of their households) who lack social 
capital as measured by the absence of working household members.  Many of the 
unemployed can be considered less disadvantaged, and hence as temporarily 
unemployed members of the working or other classes, because they do have access 
to social capital in the form of familial networks.  The effect of living in 
households without networks is similar to the effect of living in segregated 
impoverished urban neighbourhoods in some American cities (according to Wilson 




6. Unemployment, the Underclass and 
    Household Income 
 
There is a strong relationship between unemployment and inequality in South 
Africa.  Almost two-thirds (62 percent) of the unemployed are in the poorest half 
of the population (see Table 4 below). This is in stark contrast to people in regular 
employment, less than one quarter of whom are in the poorest half (and these are 
predominantly farm-workers and, to a lesser extent, domestic workers – i.e. not 
members of the industrial working-class). The unemployment rate is inversely 
related to household income: it stands at 71 percent in the bottom income decile, 
falling to 48 percent in the third decile, 33 percent in the sixth decile, 24 percent in 
the eighth decile and a mere 5 percent in the top decile. Participation rates are also 
related to income (positively). Thus a majority of households in the bottom four 
deciles have no members in employment, whilst fewer than 20 percent of 
households in deciles 7 and 8 and fewer than 10 percent of households in deciles 9 
and 10 are in the same position. Wages rise as a proportion of household income as 
one moves from lower to higher deciles. These income deciles are composed of 
households ranked by disposable household incomes, with no allowance for 
household size or composition. The relationship between unemployment rates and 
incomes is more pronounced if one uses deciles defined in terms of income per 
capita (or per adult equivalent). 
 

















households (i.e. with 
no employed and 
some unemployed 
members) (%) 
1 16 3 5 32 
2 13 5 8 20 
3 11 7 7 17 
4 11 9 9 13 
5 11 9 13 8 
6 11 11 15 6 
7 10 12 15 2 
8 10 12 15 1 
9 6 15 10 0 
10 2 17 3 0 





If we distinguish between households according to the mix of employed and 
unemployed people within them, we see a still more striking pattern. The second, 
third and fourth columns in Table 4 set out the distribution of households 
according to their mix of employed and unemployed household members. 
Households with neither employed nor unemployed members, i.e. without any 
members in the labour force, are excluded from this table. 
 
There are clear differences between the distribution of households with only 
unemployed members, households with only employed members, and households 
with both employed and unemployed members. Among the fully employed 
households, fully two-thirds are in the top five deciles. Among the entirely 
unemployed households, in contrast, only 9 percent were in the top five deciles, 
with over two-thirds in the bottom three deciles alone. Households with both 
employed and unemployed members are less concentrated, but there is a bigger 
cluster in the middle deciles (with over half – or 58 percent – in deciles 5 to 8). Put 
simply, if income is a measure of privilege, fully employed households are clearly 
privileged relative to entirely unemployed ones, and partly employed households 
are somewhere in between. If we define the underclass as comprising entirely 
unemployed households, on the basis of their relative exclusion from employment 
opportunities, we can see that this class is especially poor. 
 
Bhorat and Leibbrandt come to similar conclusions using per capita rather than 
aggregate household incomes. They report that almost two-thirds of the 
unemployed live in households with incomes below the poverty line. Moreover, a 
majority of those unemployed who are fortunate enough to be in multiple-income 
(and even multiple-worker) households fall below the poverty line, indicating that 
many households with both employed and unemployed members are in low wage 
sectors of the economy (1996: 154-5). This accords with our finding, reported 
above, that almost as many unemployed people live in households in the marginal 
working class as in the core working-class. 
 
It should be reiterated that all of this analysis takes households as the unit of 
analysis, and does not problematise the distribution of resources within households. 
It is quite possible that unemployed people in households with some working 
members have less of a claim on the household's resources, and enjoy a lower 
standard of living than even per capita data would suggest. 
 
Bhorat and Leibbrandt have already demonstrated that poverty is pervasive among 
the rural unemployed: 81 percent of the rural unemployed are below the poverty 
line, compared to 59 percent of urban and 39 percent of metropolitan unemployed. 




or metropolitan areas (1996: 153).  Working people are certainly privileged relative 
to the unemployed in terms of income. Their superior quality of life is reflected in 
their living conditions also. Consider some differences between households in 
which every economically active person is employed and those in which every 
economically active person is unemployed (i.e. the ‘underclass’). Fifty one percent 
of the former households have internal piped water, compared to just 10 percent of 
the latter households. Two out of three of the former have flush toilets, compared 
to just 18 percent of the latter. About one in three of the former have telephones, 
compared to one in thirty of the latter. Of the former, 54 percent said they were 
satisfied or even very satisfied with life; only 22 percent of the latter said the same 
– with 71 percent saying they were dissatisfied or even very dissatisfied. By a 
range of such criteria, working people enjoy a range of privileges relative to the 
unemployed. The unemployed are also marginalised with respect to a range of 
public services. Most unemployed are not eligible for the Unemployment 
Insurance Fund, for example. Many employed people – and not just rich, white 
people – have access to private pension and medical funds. 
 
Of course, the employed are themselves heterogeneous, falling into various class 
categories.  Table 5 below sets out some of the differences between the underclass 
and selected other classes (as set out in Table 1 and Figure 2, except that the ‘W.E.’ 
classes and S.P.C. are omitted). Note that the category which we had previously 
labelled ‘other’ has now been split up into the ‘underclass’ (i.e. households with 
unemployed members and no employed members) and a ‘residual’ class of 
households comprising only non-labour force participants (i.e. those not available 
for work), which we shall refer to by the ugly acronym of the N.L.F. or ‘no labour-
force’ class.  
 
Table 5 shows that there are marked differences between the indicators for the core 
working class (C.W.C.) and the underclass. Underclass households are less likely 
to be living in a house, less likely to have piped water or a toilet inside the 
dwelling, and less likely to be satisfied with life. The unemployment rate is much 
higher, of course, and household income is much lower. Underclass households see 
jobs as a more pressing problem than do core working class households. And the 
educational attainment of their children is retarded relative to the children in core 
working class households. Underclass households also compare unfavourably with 
marginal working class households according to some indicators, but not others 
(such as education). The indicators for other or N.L.F. households are also mixed. 
This data suggests that the quality of life of underclass households is worse than 
that of core working class households, but not so much worse than marginal 





Table 5.  Selected social and economic indicators, selected classes (South 
Africa, 1993) 
 




% living in a house or part of a 
house 
76 63 44 48 38 40 
Average number of rooms in 
dwelling 
6,3 4,3 3,4 2,9 3,9 3,6 
% with piped water inside 
dwelling 
90 51 31 23 10 n/a 
% with toilet inside dwelling 89 48 32 14 18 n/a 
% very satisfied or satisfied 
with life 
66 38 29 25 16 23 
Unemployment rate (%) 8 18 25 26 100 0 
Mean household income 
(R/month) 
6 573 2 257 1 187 618 377 442 
Mean per capita household 
income (R/month) 
1 730 480 253 137 n/a n/a 
% saying jobs were the thing 
that the government should act 
on to improve most the 
household’s living conditions 
14 29 35 29 43 19 
Mean educational attainment at 
age fifteen (grade) 
7,6 7,1 6,5 5,3 6,1 6,2 
Mean educational attainment at 
age nineteen (grade) 
10,8 9,5 8,8 7,7 7,6 8,7 
 





If we define the underclass in terms of disadvantaged access to employment, 
measured in terms of what might be called the household unemployment rate, then 
where do underclass households get their income from? Table 6 sets out the 
composition of income for the underclass, the residual or N.L.F. class and selected 
other classes. The underclass and N.L.F. class receive nothing from wages (by 
definition), whereas wages provide the overwhelming share (between 80 and 90 
percent) of income in the upper, intermediate, core working and marginal working 




(pensions and other transfers), which accounts for 57 and 51 percent of their 
income respectively. Remittances comprise the second major source of income, 
accounting for 36 and 41 percent respectively. Table 6 shows that these classes 
earn small percentages from other sources (bearing in mind that a small percentage 
of a low income is a very small amount). 
 
 
Table 6.  Sources of income of the underclass and N.L.F. class 
compared to selected other classes (South Africa, 1993) 
 


















Wages 83 90 89 81 0 0 
Remittances 0 1 3 6 36 41 
Agriculture 1 0 0 2 5 5 
Self employment 3 1 1 0 1 6 
Pensions 0 2 5 9 46 43 
Other public 
transfers 0 1 2 2 11 8 
Capital income 12 5 1 1 4 1 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 
 
Note: See Table 5. 
 
 
The underclass is less dependent on remittances – i.e. private, inter-household 
transfers – than on welfare, but remittances are clearly important. This reflects two 
factors: first, the absence of any welfare provision for most of the unemployed and, 
secondly, the existence of inter-household links between even the designated 
underclass households and other households. The underclass households are not 
completely disconnected. This confirms again the importance of searching for 
more nuanced proxies for labour market marginalisation than the household 
unemployment rate alone. 
 
Social networks are important for the survival of the unemployed. Some scholars 
have taken the argument one step further, pointing to remittances as evidence that 
working and unemployed people should be considered to be members of the same 
social group or class. The Labour Caucus at NEDLAC claims that ‘It is the 
employed workers who provide the social security net for the unemployed ... Given 




accommodation, food and other help to the unemployed family members’ (quoted 
in Bhorat and Leibbrandt, 1996: 144). Torres (1996) claims that ‘There is no doubt 
as to who is currently carrying the major burden of redistribution’ (87) – and the 
answer is the working class.1 
 
Table 6 shows that public welfare is more important to the underclass than 
remittances, by a ratio of 57 percent to 36 percent. If we take all unemployed 
individuals, however, then public welfare is of lesser importance. Consider first 
intra-household transfers within households not classified in our underclass. 
Almost half (47 percent) of the unemployed live in households with at least one 
formal sector wage worker (Bhorat and Leibbrandt, 1996: 154-5). In the preceding 
analysis we identified these unemployed as having a mediated class position by 
virtue of their membership of households that included at least one working 
member, whose occupation determined the class of the household as a whole. But, 
as we have seen already (Table 4), these tend to be the better off unemployed; the 
poorest unemployed are not in this relatively privileged position. A further 22 
percent of the unemployed, i.e. some of our underclass category, live in households 
that receive half or more of their total household income in remittances. In total, 
therefore, about 70 percent of the unemployed are dependent primarily on inter- or 
intra-household transfers, almost all from wage-earners. In other words, the 
unemployed divide into three groups: those dependent on intra-household transfers 
within wage-earning households, those dependent on remittances from mostly (but 
not exclusively) wage-earners, and those dependent primarily on other sources of 
income. The latter two groups are combined in our underclass category. 
 
How significant are flows of remittances to the underclass? Survey data indicates 
that remittances entail the redistribution of the equivalent of 5 percent of wage 
income (and 4 percent of total income) in South Africa as a whole. The P.S.L.S.D. 
data allows us to identify households that either receive or send remittances, 
although unfortunately it is not possible to match up donors and recipients and 
hence identify which classes remit to which other classes. Taking recipients first, 
the data shows that not all recipients of remittances are poor: over half of the total 
amounts received in remittances are received by households in the top five income 
deciles. Table 7 shows the recipients of remittances by class.  
 
 
                                                 
1 Actually, Torres is not clear on this: she writes that ‘Workers already carry a large 
share of the responsibility’ – and cites figures showing that almost as many poor 
households rely on remittances as rely on government pensions. She provides no 





Table 7.  Who receives remittances, by class (South Africa, 1993) 
 



























W.E.1 2 49 0 2 18 
Upper class 2 28 0 3 6 
W.E.2 1 29 1 1 10 
Semi-prof. 
class 3 62 2 4 17 
Intermediate 
class 7 30 1 8 10 
W.E.3 4 73 5 5 24 
Core working 
class 9 33 3 8 14 
Marginal 
working class 9 34 6 6 20 
Underclass 25 135 36 22 57 
Residual N.L.F. 
class  37 183 41 41 61 
Total 100   100  
Average  72 4  27 
 
 
One in four households receiving remittances are in the underclass (see the first 
column in Table 7). A larger proportion (37 percent) of recipient households are in 
the residual N.L.F. class, i.e. households with nobody in the labour force (whether 
employed or unemployed). There are smaller proportions in other classes, 
especially the intermediate, core working and marginal working classes. The 
second column shows that the average household in the underclass and residual 
class receives R135 and R183 per month in remittances, i.e. one-third or one-half 
of the value of an old-age pension. Unsurprisingly, the average amounts received 
in other classes are much lower. The third column shows that remittances 
constitute a significant share of household income for the underclass and residual 
class only. The fourth column shows each class’s share of the total amount of 
remittances received by all classes. The proportions here are similar to the figures 




class that receives remittances. Unsurprisingly, again, the figures are high for the 
underclass and residual class – at about 60 percent – and much lower for other 
classes.  
 
Turning to those who send remittances, we can see that most, but not all, 
remittances are sent by the core working class and intermediate class. Table 8 
shows which households send remittances, and how much, by class. The classes 
with the largest numbers of households sending remittances are indeed the core 
working class (34 percent), the intermediate class (25 percent) and the marginal 
working class (11 percent). These classes’ shares of the total remittances sent are 
33 percent, 24 percent and 6 percent respectively. But as much as 22 percent of the 
total remittances were sent by households in the W.E.1 class, upper class and 
W.E.2 class combined. The core working class remits 6 percent of its total income, 
which is the highest percentage of any class. The core working class is also the 
class with the highest percentage of households in the class sending remittances, at 
31 percent (compared to 17 percent of all households).  
 
Combining the data in Tables 7 and 8 allows us to identify the net transfers through 
remittances between classes. This is set out in Table 9. The intermediate and core 
working classes are the major sources of redistribution: their share of remittances 
sent exceeds their share of remittances received by a combined 41 percent. The 
upper class is also a significant source of redistribution. Indeed, the first three 
classes combined are a larger source of redistribution than the intermediate class. 
The underclass and, especially, the residual N.L.F. class are the major 
beneficiaries. Their share of remittances received exceeds their share of remittances 
sent by a massive 20 and 38 percent respectively. The residual N.L.F. class benefits 






























in class that 
sent 
remittances 
WE1 2 46 0 4 9 
Upper class 7 55 1 14 14 
WE2 2 81 2 4 15 
Semi-prof. 
class 6 42 1 6 21 
Intermediate 
class 25 48 2 24 23 
WE3 4 22 2 3 13 
Core working 
class 34 66 6 33 31 
Marginal 
working class 11 20 3 6 17 
Underclass 4 7 2 2 6 
Residual N.L.F. 
class 6 6 1 3  
Total 100   100  
Average  36 2  17 
 
 
Remittances constitute a significant form of redistribution between households and 
between classes. But what level or distribution of remittances would suffice to 
consider the dependant or recipient as falling into the same social group as the 
donor household, i.e. how large a financial link would suffice to render the 
recipients displaced or mediated members of the donor’s class? Clearly, if 
remittances were paltry, we would not consider automatically that the dependant 










Share of total 
remittances 
received (%) 
Share of total 
remittances sent (%) Difference 
W.E.1 2 4 –3 
Upper class 3 14 –11 
W.E.2 1 4 –3 
Semi professional class 4 6 –2 
Intermediate class 8 24 –16 
W.E.3 5 3 +2 
Core working class 8 33 –25 
Marginal working class 6 6 0 
Underclass 22 2 20 
Residual N.L.F. class 41 3 38 
Total 100 100 0 
 
 
On the basis of reasonable assumptions, we can see that the majority of 
unemployed people receive some financial support from working people in the 
intermediate class, core working class and marginal working class. Firstly, we 
know that about 42 percent of the unemployed are living in households that are in 
these classes. Secondly, of the 53 percent of unemployed people who are in the 
underclass, 57 percent live in households that receive some remittances, although 
in some cases remittances will constitute only a small proportion of their income. If 
we guess that nine-tenths of these receive their remittances from friends and 
relations who are themselves in the intermediate, core and marginal working 
classes, then we can estimate that the total proportion of the unemployed who are 
supported to some extent by these three classes is equal to 0.42 plus nine-tenths of 
0.57 times 0.53. This works out at about 0.69, or 69 percent. It is thus correct that, 
in the absence of any public welfare system for the unemployed, the working 
classes (broadly defined so as to include the intermediate class also) shoulder much 
of the burden of supporting the unemployed. At the same time, however, we must 
note that almost one-third of the unemployed receive no support at all from these 
three classes and, within the underclass itself, households are more dependent on 
old-age pensions than they are on remittances. 
 
Further research is required concerning the relationships between donor and 
recipient. Does it make any difference whether remittances are sent by and to 
immediate family members? This has a bearing on how we conceptualise and 
operationalise the underclass: should absent family members be included in the 





It has also been argued that workers support the unemployed indirectly. Workers 
spending means more jobs, which is especially beneficial for the unemployed if 
workers spend their money in those areas where the unemployed live and are 
therefore able to find informal employment, for example as hawkers. A macro-
economic version of this argument entails rising wages leading to economic 
growth, i.e. wage-led growth (see COSATU, 1996). This view has been described 
as a kind of ‘radical trickle-down theory’ – referring by analogy to the left critique 
of the view that economic growth is good for the poor. In radical trickle-down 
theory, rising wages for working people leads to benefits trickling down to the 
unemployed through increased spending and the employment growth this 
generates. Such an approach is integral to the government’s hard ‘high-
productivity-now’ growth strategy (see Nattrass, 2001).  
 
Even if higher wages do raise demand and hence lead to economic growth (which 
is dubious, especially in an open-economy context), it is certainly not evident that 
they would lead to employment growth. In the past, economic growth has been 
biased more in favour of higher wages for people already in employment than 
more jobs for the unemployed. There is also evidence that employment is inversely 
related to wages.  Formal wage employment has fallen steadily across the 1990s, 
whereas average real wages have risen sharply.   
 
The distributional effects of wage increases are very uncertain. Indeed, it is far 
from clear that the unemployed would benefit more from increased spending by 
workers than they would from increased spending on investment out of profits, or 
even from increased spending by upper class households. We are not aware of 
studies that compare the expenditure patterns of different classes or of investment 
as opposed to consumption in sufficient detail to identify their redistributional 
consequences. 
 
To get a full picture of financial transfers to the unemployed and poor, we shall 
need to consider also the incidence of taxation and government expenditure. These 
are entirely ignored in most studies (including Torres, 1996). McGrath et al. (1997) 
estimate that the top quintile (i.e. the ninth and tenth deciles) pay between 76 and 
80 per cent of all taxes. The fourth quintile (i.e. the seventh and eighth deciles) pay 
about 12 per cent of all taxes. The poorest 60 percent of the population pay, in 
total, only about 10 per cent of all taxes. McGrath et al do not provide data broken 
down by class but, given the distribution of classes across deciles (see Seekings, 
2003: Tables 12 and 13), we can safely assume that the share of taxation paid by 
the core and marginal working classes is small; even if we include the share paid 
by the intermediate class (which comprises a significant minority of the top two 




certain that these classes receive a larger share of public expenditure than they pay 
in taxation. Any redistribution to the poor – including the unemployed poor – 
through the fiscus is redistribution from the higher classes. The value of 
redistribution from the higher classes to the underclass through taxes and public 
welfare payments paid in cash is probably about the same as, and may indeed be 
slightly higher than, the value of redistribution from the intermediate, core working 
and marginal working classes to the underclass through remittances and 
tax/welfare payments combined. If we took into account the value of publicly-
funded education, health care, housing and so on, then the value of redistribution 
from the richer classes to the underclass would be significantly greater than the 
value of redistribution to the underclass from the intermediate, core working and 
marginal working classes. 
 
 
Workers and the Unemployed: Different Class 
Locations? 
 
We have made a case that some unemployed people might be considered to be 
relative insiders in the labour market, despite being unemployed, on account of 
their better access to employment opportunities. How is our analysis of the class 
structure affected by the possibility of a trade-off between wage growth and job 
creation, i.e. between the interests of the already employed and the unemployed? 
 
One reading of the negative relationship between wages and employment holds 
that the employed and unemployed have conflicting interests: wage growth for the 
already employed leads to reduced employment, whereas lower wages would lead 
to employment growth. However, just because there is evidence of a strong trade 
off between wages and employment in South Africa, it does not necessarily follow 
that reducing the wages of already-employed workers is the appropriate strategy 
for boosting employment. Lower average wages (and more employment) could be 
brought about through the expansion of lower-wage labour-intensive sectors and 
activities (i.e. structural change) rather than through lower wages for already 
employed workers. In this way, new employment growth could occur without any 
wage reductions for already-employed workers (providing, of course, that their 
wages were in line with productivity).   
 
The economic growth path has and is not conducive to creating jobs for low-skilled 
people.  It was clearly the case that the apartheid state encouraged capital-intensive 
growth, thereby boosting average wages whilst reducing the demand for unskilled, 
low-wage labour. Increased competition from low-wage developing countries in 




and the pursuit of a ‘high-productivity-now’ growth path by the post-apartheid 
government continues the bias against unskilled labour, albeit in a slightly different 
form (Nattrass, 2001). Secondly, labour market institutions – in particular 
industrial-level bargaining which extends wage-agreements to those workers and 
firms not party to the agreement – serve to reduce the wage dispersion (Nattrass, 
2000b). Together, these mean that the interests of the unskilled unemployed, 
especially, are not being promoted by the state’s labour market, trade and industrial 
policies. In this sense at least, there is a conflict of interest between the employed 
and the unemployed. 
 
Given these structural and institutional forces which act against sustained and 
significant job creation – particularly for the many unemployed with no work 
experience or marketable skills – the unskilled, inexperienced unemployed are in a 
profoundly disadvantaged situation. To use Marxist jargon: the unemployed stand 
in an objectively different relation to the productive forces than the employed; and 
the relations of production serve to reinforce and reproduce such divisions. There is 
thus a case for differentiating, in class terms, between the employed and the 
unemployed. However, as we argue above, some of the unemployed (those living 
in households with no employed members) are more marginalised than others. This 
underclass is thus likely to be particularly disadvantaged by their lack of access to 
what few jobs may be on offer. 
 
We have seen that those unemployed who live in households with working 
members, and therefore have mediated class positions, are in higher income deciles 
than households in the underclass (Table 4). We have suggested, but without direct 
quantitative evidence, that the former have better access to employment 
opportunities than the latter. Is there any other evidence that unemployed members 
of the core working class, i.e. who have a mediated class position in that class by 
virtue of living in the same household as a working person, are privileged relative 
to unemployed people in the underclass? We do have evidence on the educational 
attainment of children in different households. In Working Paper 31 I showed that 
there are marked differences by class in the educational attainment of children, 
such that inequality is likely to be transmitted between generations. Table 4 above 
shows that the educational attainment of children in the underclass was 
significantly worse than that of children in the core working class. By the age of 
nineteen, children in core working class households have reached, on average, 
more than one grade more than children in underclass households. If we select only 
those core working class households that have unemployed members, the 
differences are just as big. In other words, children in core working class 
households that have unemployed members proceed faster and further through the 
school system than children in underclass households with (by definition) 








7. The Attitudes and Perceptions of the 
    Unemployed 
 
Is unemployment – and especially the special disadvantage experienced by the 
underclass – consequential in terms of attitudes and perceptions? We have very 
little evidence on this. Some studies suggest that the unemployed see themselves as 
different to employed workers. The most striking evidence comes from a study by 
Moller (1992), based on qualitative interviews and a quantitative survey among a 
total of 1 300 unemployed African people in 1987 and 1989 in Soweto, Mdantsane 
(East London) and the Greater Durban area. Just over half (53 percent) met the 
CSS definition of strict unemployment, with the rest fitting into the expanded 
definition (ibid: 16-7). 
 
Moller found that the unemployed not only had a far lower perceived quality of life 
than township dwellers as a whole (ibid: 50), but also experienced a range of 
psychological problems arising from unemployment. Unemployed people were 
anxious, fearful and depressed. According to one unemployed person: ‘Everything 
is bad; friendship is bad, love is bad, even your own thinking is bad’ (ibid: 51). The 
1989 survey indicated that: 
 
‘Approximately one in two unemployed felt depressed, nervous, unable 
to concentrate, had difficulty falling asleep at night, or got angry and 
upset easily. Three to four in ten felt useless and without energy. There 
is some indication that the negative mood tone had been brought on by 
unemployment. Only one-third of the former job-holders reported that 
they felt depressed while they were still working in a job’ (ibid: 54).. 
 
People suffered from boredom. Unemployment also led to problems of self-esteem, 
although the fact that unemployment rates were so high meant that unemployment 
was seen as a social rather than purely individual problem.   
 
Moller was told that unemployment was very disruptive of relationships. She 
reports that 59 percent stated that they often or sometimes felt lonely, 46 percent 
felt that people avoided them and 55 percent believed that employed people did not 
really care about their (unemployed people’s) welfare (ibid: 84). Eighty-one 
percent in the pilot study agreed with the statement that ‘people who lose their 




people that you always share what you have with them. If you are unemployed you 
have nothing to share, then they walk away from you,’ ‘The day I lost my job was 
the day I lost my friends,’ ‘If you keep asking your friends for cigarettes, beer and 
bus fare they get fed up and decide to keep away from you until you get a job’. 
You become ‘a menace to your friends asking them for this and that, and finally 
you go without friends’ (ibid: 50, 85). Two thirds of the pilot study agreed with the 
statement that unemployed people cannot expect to get as much love from their 
families as they did when they were working (ibid: 87). Against this, however, 
over half said that they made new friends – usually neighbours and other 
unemployed people (ibid: 86).   
 
Evidence of household formation adds to this picture. Klasen and Woolard (1998: 
17) and Simkins (2000: 11-12) show that unemployment is associated with delays 
in marriage and independent household formation. Young unemployed people are 
typically resident in large households; young employed people live in separate, 
small households (Wittenberg and Pearce, 1996). Simkins (2000: 12) argues 
further that delays in marriage as a result of unemployment increases the risks of 
sexually transmitted diseases and AIDS infections. 
 
Employment was clearly viewed as of crucial social and economic importance 
among the unemployed as well as the employed. According to Moller: ‘There is 
little doubt that the social status and identity of urban blacks are derived from 
working in a job regardless of the intrinsic satisfactions it confers. It is 
noteworthy that workers frequently wear their working apparel after hours as a 
badge of social identity’ (1992: 10). The unemployed were asked if they agreed 
or disagreed with the following: ‘Conditions in most jobs in which blacks are 
employed are so bad, it is often better to be unemployed’: 83 percent disagreed, 
15 percent agreed and 2 percent were undecided (ibid: 115). Asked what were 
the most serious problems facing people, most cited unemployment (ibid: 72). 
 
Not only do the unemployed tend to see themselves as different from employed 
people, in certain important respects at least, but they are also critical of trade 
unions’ roles in inhibiting job creation. Asked by Moller what were the causes of 
unemployment, most unemployed people cited economic factors including labour 
issues. Some blamed immigration by foreign workers (ibid: 136-8). Others blamed 
trade unions. Moller provides examples of the latter: ‘The closing of companies 
because of the trade unions; trade unions promote disinvestment; I don’t know why 
the trade unions acted this way’ (ibid: 137); ‘Employed people are striking for 
better wages; their protest blocks the chances for the unemployed’ (ibid: 137). 
Similar criticisms have been expressed by organisations claiming to represent the 
unemployed, including the Unemployed Masses of South Africa (claiming 32 000 




000 members) – although it should be acknowledged that both organisations had 
links to opposition political parties (Vlok, 1998). 
 
Some corroboration is provided in a study by Charney, based on focus group 
research among African people in late 1994. Charney was primarily interested in 
gauging the expectations of African people after the elections but, in probing what 
people expected to receive, he uncovered fascinating accounts of why people did 
not expect to get more. He found that expectations were modest among most 
sections of the African population, in large part because people saw that the 
government operated within tight economic constraints. In this unpromising 
economic climate, most people were very critical of strikes because they were seen 
as discouraging investors and jeopardising growth (Charney, 1995: 29). 
 
The attitudes of many working and most unemployed people do seem to differ 
with regard to the priority attached to job creation. Each of the focus groups in 
Charney’s study was asked the following: ‘Some people say, “Workers should 
get the highest possible wages they can, based on their skills and experience.” 
Others say, “Workers should be willing to accept lower increases so that more 
people can get work.” What do you think?’ (ibid: 7-8). Almost all of the groups 
favoured the second option – with the dissenters coming from precisely those 
groups that stand to gain the most from a high-wage, low-employment scenario. 
 
‘Higher wages received preference over job creation only amongst the 
trade unionists and some formal township dwellers, particularly better-
educated youth. They argued that the highest possible wages are the 
fairest, both to reward skill and experience and to reduce poverty. If 
wages are held down, it should be those of whites, not blacks’ (ibid: 7-
8). 
 
Unionised African workers’ views might be self-serving, but may well be based in 
a moral perspective on justice and injustice. They may compare their positions and 
incomes with those of their bosses (mostly white), white workers, or white people 
in general, and see the differences as unjust (which, of course, is not altogether 
unreasonable). The unemployed and poor, however, presumably see their positions 
as underprivileged relative to working African people. These different perspectives 
on the justice of rewards reflect the position of most of the urban, industrial 
working class above the median but below the mean income, whereas the poor and 






The Importance of Jobs 
 
At first glance, Charney’s findings sit uneasily with the results of opinion polls that 
routinely showed at the time (i.e. 1994) that the overwhelming majority of South 
Africans thought that unemployment was the most important problem facing the 
country. Indeed, the P.S.L.S.D. survey found that jobs were identified as the most 
important problem in almost every income decile.  If there are marked differences 
in the priorities of working and unemployed people, as Charney found, why is 
there such consistency (excepting the very rich) in the identification of jobs as the 
most important problem facing the country? Closer examination of the P.S.L.S.D. 
data suggests an answer: how respondents answer the question depends no only on 
their household income (and hence which decile they are in) or even just the class 
they are in, but also their own individual labour market status and even the labour 
market status of other members of their household. In the P.S.L.S.D. survey, data 
was collected on the entire household from just one respondent. Which household 
member responded was important for these attitudinal questions. These differences 
are often disguised when either attitudinal variables are treated as household rather 
than individual variables or if individuals are not seen as located in households 
with other members.  
 
In Working Paper 24 I examined the evidence from the P.S.L.S.D. on attitudes to 
the importance of unemployment as well as reported general satisfaction with life 
(Seekings, 2002).  Three patterns were clear.  First, the priority attached to job 
creation and general satisfaction varied by class.  There was a clear inverse 
relationship between class and satisfaction, with the ‘higher’ classes more satisfied 
than the ‘lower’ ones.  The picture was slightly more complex with respect to the 
importance of job creation, although the upper class attached least priority to it and 
the underclass the most.  Secondly, there were important differences within each 
class according to the labour market status of the respondent.  Thus unemployed 
members of the intermediate class, for example, attached much more importance to 
job creation than employed members of the same class.  Thirdly, even employed 
members of a class were more likely to prioritise job creation if other members of 
their households were unemployed than employed members of the same class in 
fully-employed households.  The importance attached to job creation and general 
levels of satisfaction vary not only according to the respondent’s class but also 
according to the respondent’s labour market status and even the labour market 
status of other household members.  Respondents in the underclass reported the 
lowest level of satisfaction of all classes (as we saw in Table 4 above).  They also 
attached more importance to job creation than any other class. 
 
The K.M.P.S. also posed a range of attitudinal questions to respondents.  These 




to taxation, and attitudes to unions and business. The results, as reported in the 
earlier Working Paper, were inconclusive (ibid).  Whilst respondents in these 
African and coloured areas of Cape Town exhibited a range of responses, there was 
little correlation between labour market status (or even the labour market status of 
other household members) and responses.  The contrast between the K.M.P.S. 
findings and the P.S.L.S.D. findings is striking and remains unexplained.  Further 
research – both quantitative and qualitative – is clearly needed into the relationship 




8. Unemployment, the Underclass and Crime 
 
In America, the underclass is associated with criminality.  In Wilson’s work, this is 
because crime is one of the factors that underpin systematic disadvantage in some 
neighbourhoods.  In the more conservative view of (for example) Murray, 
criminality is part of a broader problem of moral decay: the underclass, comprising 
above all the predominantly black population of inner-city ghettos, is characterised 
by very high unemployment, dropout from school, alcoholism and drug abuse, 
teenage pregnancy, single mothering, violence, incarceration in the prison system, 
and financial dependency on welfare. 
 
Bizarrely, the conservative American concept of the underclass is not so very 
different to the Marxist concept of the ‘lumpen proletariat’. Marx himself wrote of 
the lumpen proletariat in stridently indignant terms: ‘This scum of the depraved 
elements of all classes’, ‘vagabonds living off the crumbs of society’, ‘the 
dangerous class, the social scum, that passively rotting mass thrown off by the 
lowest layers of the old society’ (quoted in Morris, 1994: 15). In the great Russian 
film The Strike, directed by Eisenstein as Communist Party propaganda in the 
1920s, the lumpen proletariat lived in an expanse of dustbins, popping out when 
the agents of the ruling class sought strike-breakers! 
 
Similar arguments were made in South Africa in the 1950s, with reference to 
unemployed urban ‘youth’. Writing in 1961, with reference to riots that took place 
in East London nine years before, Reader wrote: 
 
‘It was particularly apt that the urge to destruction and brutality should 
have been expressed primarily through the medium of tsotsi youths. 
Offspring of temporary and shiftless liaisons … they had come into the 
world unwelcome and unloved … born into disease, squalor and 




maimed, the dagga-smokers and shebeen-frequenters, a few sub-mental 
cases, several with previous convictions, as well as some of good 
character who were swept in on impulse. Rejected alike by the society 
which spawned them and by the economy in which they had no place, 
these children distilled in their moment of frenzy all the bitterness felt by 
their community at large against those who appeared to crush and 
exploit them … The tsotsis, unlike the majority of adults present at the 
time, were able to strike in an ecstasy of abandon, with no property, no 
future, no employment, nothing to lose save their seemingly worthless 
lives’ (Reader, 1961: 28; see further Glaser, 1994). 
 
In the 1970s, too, and again in the 1980s, ‘political’ violence was widely attributed 
to unemployed young men (see Seekings, 1993). 
 
In the 1990s, too, violence and crime are often linked to unemployment in the press 
and elsewhere (e.g. Hirschowitz et al, 1994: 76). But, when violence and crime 
have been attributed to a specified group, it has generally been to the amorphous 
category of ‘youth’ rather than to the unemployed per se. In the early 1990s, 
especially, South Africa’s white elite were gripped with a ‘moral panic’ around the 
threat that the ‘lost generation’ of (black) ‘youth’ supposedly posed to social and 
political stability (see Seekings, 1995, 1996). In certain respects, the concept of the 
‘youth’ is not dissimilar to the conservative understanding of the underclass: both 
refer to groups that supposedly fall outside of those structures of society that 
socialise and sustain ‘respectable’ people: school (from which the ‘youth’ had 
dropped out), work (which they never had), the family (which had broken down) 
and the ‘community’ (which had also fragmented).  Indeed, in the U.K. and 
elsewhere, there is a close relationship between perceptions of ‘dangerous youth’ 
and those of the ‘underclass’ (see MacDonald, 1997). 
 
In South Africa, research failed to support the assumptions made about the ‘youth’. 
As Schlemmer (1991) wrote, ‘typical young people in the townships are not over-
politicised or hyper-radicalised, deviant, amoral or anti-social’ (1991). Surveys 
suggest that young people are as opposed to crime and delinquency as their 
parents. This is not to say that young people do not face huge problems – 
including, as we have seen, very high unemployment rates – but rather that they 
show remarkable resilience in the face of such challenges (Seekings, 1996: 119-
123). 
 
The lesson of the literature on the ‘youth’ is that we should interrogate carefully the 
perceived association between unemployment and criminality or moral deviance. 
Unfortunately, there is a glaring absence of research on the link between 




more than a welcome caution. The unemployed, she emphasised, did not conform 
to the negative stereotype: 
 
‘As far as one is able to tell, the unemployed in the main study show few 
of the typically negative characteristics of the unemployed. According to 
self-reports, they are not resorting to drink, thievery, idleness; they are 
neither dirty nor unkempt as the stereo-types suggest’ (Moller, 1992: 
09). 
 
Moller does note, however, that men responded to unemployment differently to 
women: 
 
‘Unemployed men tend to be more aggressive when it comes to airing 
their frustrations; women more retiring. Hence men are more inclined to 
act in socially unacceptable ways. The informal channels for gaining 
social support and an alternative income appear to serve women better 
than men. The person whose self-identity is possibly most at risk appears 
to be the mature man with little education, i.e. the retrenched unskilled 
labourer’ (ibid: 147). 
 
Further research is clearly needed, but we can conclude that there is little evidence 
that the unemployed engage in criminal behaviour or hold deviant morality to an 




9. Conclusion  
 
The concept of an ‘underclass’ has unfortunate connotations.  Its use may 
encourage the pejorative stereotyping of people whose only ‘crime’ is to have 
suffered systematic disadvantage.  We should therefore be cautious in using the 
concept.  In South Africa, however, there are good theoretical and empirical 
grounds for recognising a section of the population that suffers especially acute 
disadvantage. This class comprises people who are not only unemployed in a 
society where unemployment means poverty, but also lack the capital to give them 
a significant chance of securing employment in future.  The label ‘underclass’ is an 
appropriate recognition of the systematic disadvantage that distinguishes this class 
from the bulk of the working population. 
 
The concept of an underclass might have theoretical foundations in the South 




unemployment clearly helps to explain differences in income.  Less clearly, 
unemployment shapes attitudes on labour market issues, satisfaction and self-
esteem.  The special disadvantages experienced by the underclass are reflected in 
very low incomes, poor living conditions and, perhaps, in attitudes.  There is little 
evidence, however, that the unemployed (or, specifically, those within the 
underclass, as defined in this paper) are any more likely to engage in acts of crime 
or violence than anyone else. 
 
These findings remain tentative, given the inadequacy of the available data.  There 
are many other issues that require further analysis. Crucially, we have little 
evidence on how disadvantage is reproduced over time. We know that 
unemployment and employment tend to cluster in different households – but we do 
not know how long such effects last, and how permanent they are. We have some 
evidence that the children of unemployed parents suffer lower levels of educational 
attainment than children of working parents. But does the underclass really 
reproduce itself over generations, with the children born into underclass 
households today destined (i.e. with a high probability) to long periods of 
unemployment in ten or twenty years time? Do many households – or individuals – 
escape the web of disadvantage, and how do they do so? 
 
In their study of the U.S.A., Massey and Denton (1993) pay special attention to the 
‘perpetuation’ of the underclass.  In their analysis, racial segregation plays a crucial 
role in reinforcing, again and again, the isolation of the underclass.  In South 
Africa, with the passage of apartheid and especially the very different demographic 
composition of society, racial segregation cannot play the same role.  It is to be 
hoped that in the new South Africa opportunities for social mobility have improved 
across the whole of society.  Even if prejudices and cleavages have emerged, it is 
surely unlikely that these can have the same force and effect as systematic racial 
segregation amd discrimination?  Hope and expectations of a future characterised 
by greater equality of opportunity should not blind us to the constraints and 
obstacles that remain. 
 
There are clearly many households outside of the underclass, as we have defined it, 
that are marginalised in a variety of ways. Some have nobody in the labour force 
(i.e. they are in the residual N.L.F. class). Others are involved in employment very 
precariously, perhaps because they have casual or part-time work in sectors 
characterised by low wages and bad working conditions, or perhaps because they 
lack skills and face a real threat of retrenchment.  A different approach to 
‘marginality’ might usefully focus on more than just the unemployed without 
social capital. Our concern in this Working Paper is not to deny the marginality of 
many other households, but rather to probe the specific question of the class 




such research should be sure to develop clear empirical measures.  
 
It is possible that such research might develop the concept of ‘social exclusion’.  
The concept of ‘social exclusion’ arose among scholars unhappy with the 
pejorative connotations attached to the concept of the ‘underclass’ in the U.S.A. 
and elsewhere. The concept originated in France to describe that section of the 
population characterised by unemployment or very precarious employment. 
Proponents of the concept claim that it is preferable to the concept of poverty 
because it emphasises more fully the social element of deprivation rather than the 
economic element of low incomes. Social exclusion thus denotes those forms of 
poverty and marginality that result from the breakdown of the prior relationship 
between society and the individual (Bhalla and Lapeyre, 1999). The concept 
remains, however, difficult to specify clearly enough to allow comparative, 
empirical measurement and analysis. 
 
Whatever labels are used, more data is clearly needed on the character of 
disadvantage in post-apartheid South Africa and especially on the effects of 









Adam, H. 1997. The Underclass vs the Liberation Aristocracy. Paper presented at 
the Centre for African Studies Seminar, University of Cape Town. 
 
Adler, G. & G. O’Sullivan. 1996. Rounding Up the Usual Suspects: Recycling the 
Labour Aristocracy Thesis. In Baskin, J. (ed.) Against the Current: Labour 
and Economic Policy in South Africa, 165-85. Johannesburg: Ravan Press.  
 
Adler, G. & E. Webster. 1999. Towards a Class Compromise in South Africa’s 
‘Double Transition’: Bargained Liberalization and the Consolidation of 
Democracy. Politics and Society 27 (3), 347-85. 
 
Baber, R. 1998. The Structure of Livelihoods in South Africa’s Bantustans: 
Evidence from Two Settlements in Northern Province. D.Phil Thesis in 
Economics. Oxford: University of Oxford.  
 
Barbieri, P. with S. Paugam & H. Russell. 2000.  Social Capital and Exits from 
Unemployment.  In D. Gallie & S. Paugam (eds).  Welfare Regimes and the 
Experience of Unemployment in Europe.  Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Bhalla, A.S. & F. Lapeyre. 1999.  Poverty and Exclusion in a Global World.  
Basingstoke: Macmillan. 
 
Bhorat, H. 2000. Some people are more jobless than others. Sunday Independent. 5 
November. 
 
Bhorat, H. & M. Leibbrandt. 1996. Understanding Unemployment: The 
Relationship Between the Employed and the Jobless. In J. Baskin (ed.) 
Against the Current: Labour and Economic Policy in South Africa, 143-64 
Johannesburg: Ravan Press. 
 
Bhorat, H. & M. Leibbrandt. 1999. Correlates of Vulnerability in the South African 
Labour Market. Working Paper 99/27. Cape Town: Development Policy 
Research Unit, University of Cape Town.  (This is also published as Chapter 
4 of Bhorat, Leibbrandt et al. Fighting Poverty: Labour Markets and 
Inequality in South Africa. Cape Town: University of Cape Town Press, 
2001). 
 




National Survey of South African Youth. Report for the National Youth 
Development Conference, Broederstroom (March). 
 
Charney, C. 1995. Voices of a New Democracy: African Expectations in the 
New South Africa.  Research Report 38.  Johannesburg: Centre for Policy 
Studies. 
 
Devine, E. 1997. Social Class in America and Britain. Edinburgh: Edinburgh 
University Press. 
 
Erasmus, J. 1999.  Coping Strategies of the Unemployed.  Pretoria: Human 
Sciences Research Council. 
 
Evans, G. (ed.) 1999.  The End of Class Politics? Class Voting in Comparative 
Perspective.  Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Gallie, D. 1994. Are The Unemployed an Underclass? Some Evidence from the 
Social Change and Economic Life Initiative.  Sociology 28 (3), 737-757. 
 
Gallie, D., J. Gershuny & C. Vogler. 1994.  Unemployment, the Household and 
Social Networks.  In Gallie, D., Marsh, C. & C. Vogler (eds) Social Change 
and the Experience of Unemployment. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Gallie, D. & C. Marsh. 1994. The Experience of Unemployment.  In Gallie, D., 
Marsh, C. & C. Vogler (eds) Social Change and the Experience of 
Unemployment. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Gelb, S. & E. Webster. 1996. Jobs and Equity: The Social Democratic Challenge. 
South African Labour Bulletin  20 (3), 73-8. 
 
Glaser, C. 1994. Youth Culture and Politics in Soweto, 1958-1976.  Unpublished 
PhD thesis in History, Cambridge University. 
 
Greenberg, S. & H. Giliomee. 1985.  Managing Influx Control from the Rural End: 
The Black Homelands and the Underbelly of Privilege.  In Giliomee & L. 
Schlemmer (eds). Up Against the Fences: Poverty, Passes and Privilege in 
South Africa.  Cape Town: David Philip. 
 
Harvey, S. 1996.  Labour Market Killing Fields.  South African Labour Bulletin 20 
(2), 28-31. 
 




In Everatt, D. (ed.) Creating a Future: Youth Policy for South Africa.  
Johannesburg: Ravan Press. 
 
Kenny B. & E. Webster. 1998. Eroding the Core: Flexibility and the 
Resegmentation of the South African Labour Market.  Critical Sociology 24 
(3). 
 
Kingdon, G. 1999.  Presentation at Workshop on Unemployment.  Institute for 
Economics and Statistics, Oxford University. 
 
Klasen, S. & I. Woolard. 1998. Unemployment, Household Formation, Poverty 
and Nutrition in South Africa. Draft paper presented at a Workshop at the 
University of Pretoria, Pretoria.  
 
MacDonald, R. (ed.). 1997.  Youth, the ‘Underclass’ and Social Exclusion.  
London: Routledge. 
 
Marshall, G., Roberts, S. & C. Burgoyne. 1996.  Social Class and the Underclass in 
Britain and the U.S.A..  British Journal of Sociology 47 (1), 22-44. 
 
Massey, D.S. & N.A. Denton. 1993.  American Apartheid: Segregation and the 
Making of the Underclass.  Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
 
McCartan, P. 1984.  Recruitment and Wage Determination Procedures of 
Manufacturing Firms in the Eastern Cape.  Cape Town: Carnegie 
Conference on Poverty and Development in Southern Africa, conference 
paper no. 121. 
 
McGrath, M., Janisch, J. & C. Horner. 1997. Redistribution through the Fiscal 
System in the South African Economy.  Paper presented at the Economic 
Society of South Africa conference, Potchefstroom.  
 
Moller, V. 1992. Quality of Life in Unemployment: A Survey Evaluation of 
Black Township Dwellers. Pretoria: H.S.R.C. Publications.  
 
Morris, L. 1994.  Dangerous Classes: The Underclass and Social Citizenship.  
London: Routledge. 
 
Murray, C. 1984. Losing Ground.  New York: Basic Books. 
 






Nattrass, N. 2000a. Wage-Strategies and Minimum Wages in Decentralised 
Regions: The Case of the Clothing Industry in Phuthaditjhaba, South Africa. 
International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 24 (4), 873-888. 
 
Nattrass, N. 2000b. Inequality, Unemployment and Wage-Setting Institutions in 
South Africa. Studies in Economics and Econometrics 24(3), 129-142. 
 
Nattrass, N. 2000c. The Debate about Unemployment in the 1990s. Journal for 
Studies in Economics and Econometrics  24 (3), 73-90. 
 
Nattrass, N. 2001. High Productivity Now: A Critique of South Africa’s Growth 
Strategy.  Transformation 45, 1-24. 
 
O.E.C.D.. 1999a. Labour Market Performance and the O.E.C.D. jobs Strategy. 
Economic Outlook 65, June, 142-161. 
 
O.E.C.D.. 1999b. Employment Protection and Labour Market Performance. 
Employment Outlook June, 49-132.  
 
O.E.C.D.. 1999c. Employment Outlook June  
 
Reader, D. 1961. The Black Man’s Portion; History, Demography and Living 
Conditions in the Native Locations of East London, Cape Province. Cape 
Town: Oxford University Press.  
 
Riordan, R. 1992. Marginalised Youth and Unemployment. In Everatt, D. & E. 
Sisulu (eds) Black Youth in Crisis: Facing the Future. Johannesburg: Ravan 
Press, 69-89. 
 
Runciman, W.G. 1990. How Many Classes Are There in Contemporary British 
Society? Sociology 24 (3), 377-396. 
 
Samson, M., Babson, O., MacQuene, K., Van Niekerk, I. & R. van Niekerk. 
2000. The Macroeconomic Implications of Poverty-reducing Income 
Transfers. Paper presented at the conference Towards a Sustainable and 
Comprehensive Social Security System, Institute for Social Development, 
University of the Western Cape, Cape Town.  
 
Schlemmer, L. 1991. An Orientation to Youth and Politics in South Africa. Paper 





Seekings, J. 1993. Heroes or Villains? Youth Politics in the 1990s. Johannesburg: 
Ravan Press.  
 
Seekings, J. 1995. Media Representations of Youth and the South African 
Transition, 1989-1994. South African Sociological Review 7 (2), 25-42. 
 
Seekings, J. 1996. The ‘Lost Generation’: South Africa’s ‘Youth Problem’ in the 
Early 1990s. Transformation 29, 103-25. 
 
Seekings, J. 2002. Unemployment and Distributive Justice: Some Inconclusive 
Evidence from Cape Town. Working Paper 24. Cape Town: Centre for 
Social Science Research, University of Cape Town. 
 
Seekings, J.  2003.  Social Stratification and Inequality in South Africa at the 
End of Apartheid. Working Paper 31. Cape Town: Centre for Social 
Science Research, University of Cape Town. 
 
Seekings, J. & N. Nattrass. Forthcoming.  From Race to Class.  New Haven: 
Yale University Press. 
 
Simkins, C. 1978a. Measuring and Predicting Unemployment in South Africa, 
1960-77. In Simkins, C. & D. Clarke (eds) Structural Unemployment in 
Southern Africa. Pietermaritzburg: Natal University Press.  
 
Simkins, C. 1978b. African Unemployment in Urban and Rural South Africa. In 
Simkins, C. & C. Desmond (eds) South African Unemployment: A Black 
Picture. Development Studies Research Group Agency, University of 
Natal Durban and Agency for Industrial Mission, Johannesburg.  
 
Simkins, C. 2001. Can South Africa Avoid a Malthusian Poverty Check? 
Daedalus 130 (1), 123-50. 
 
Standing, G., Sender, J. & J. Weeks. 1996. The South African Challenge: 
Restructuring the South African Labour Market. International Labour 
Organisation, Geneva. 
 
Theron, J. 1999. Terms of Empowerment. South African Labour Bulletin 20 (1), 6-
14. 
 
Torres, L. 1996. Welfare and Redistribution: Whose Responsibility is It? South 





Van der Berg, S. 2001. An Analysis of Fiscal Incidence of Social Spending in 
South Africa, 1993-97. Social Dynamics 27 (1), 140-164.  
 
Vlok, E. An Unholy Alliance? Organising the Unemployed. South African Labour 
Bulletin 22 (5), 40-45. 
 
Wilson, W.J. 1987. The Truly Disadvantaged: The Inner City, the Underclass, and 
Public Policy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
 
Wilson, W.J. 1991. Chapter in Jencks, C. & P. Petersen (eds). The Urban 
Underclass. Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution. 
 
Wilson, W.J. 1997. When Work Disappears: The World of the New Urban Poor. 
New York: Vintage Books.  
 
Wittenberg, M. 1999.  Job Search and Household Structure in an Era of Mass 
Unemployment.  Potchefstroom: South African Network for Economic 
Research (SANER) Working Paper no. 22. 
 
Wittenberg, M & C. Pearce. 1996. Youth and Unemployment: Some Perspectives 
from the South African Living Standards and Development Survey. In 
Chisholm, L. et al (eds) Out of School Youth Report: Policy and Provision 
for Out-of-School and Out-of-Work Youth. Education Policy Unit. 
Johannesburg: University of the Witwatersrand.  
 
Wright, E. Olin. 1997. Class Counts: Comparative Studies in Class Analysis. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
 
The Centre for Social Science Research 






17/02 Are Urban Black Families Nuclear? A Comparataive 
Study of Black and White South African Family 
Norms 
By M. Russell 
18/02 AIDS and Human Security in Southern Africa By N. Nattrass 
19/02 Public Works as a Response to Labour Market Failure 
in South Africa 
By A. McCord 
20/02 Race, Inequality and Urbanisation in the Johannesburg 
Region, 1946-1996 




The “Status” of Giving in South Africa:  An 
Empirical Investigation into the Behaviour and 
Attitudes of South Africans towards Redistribution 
By C. Pengelly 
22/02 How Important is Education for Getting Ahead in 
South Africa? 
By M. Keswell &  
L. Poswell 
23/02 Missing Links?  An Examination of the Contribution 
made by Social Surveys to our Understanding of Child 
Well-Being in South Africa  
By R.Bray 
24/02 Unemployment and Distributive Justice in South Africa:  
Some Inconclusive Evidence from Cape Town 
By J. Seekings 
25/02 Comparing Alternative Measures of Household Income: 
Evidence from the Khayelitsha/Mitchell’s Plain Survey 
By J. Skordis &  
M. Welch 
26/02 The Employment of Domestic Workers by Black Urban 
Households 
By M. Russell 
 
27/02 Poverty, Survival and Democracy in Southern Africa By R. Mattes, M. 
Bratton & Y.D 
Davids 
28/03 The Cost Of HIV Prevention And Treatment 
Interventions In South Africa  
 
By N. Geffen  
N. Nattrass & 
C. Raubenheimer  
31/03 Social Stratification and Inequality in South Africa at 
the end of Apartheid 
By J. Seekings 
         
 
 
The Centre for Social Science Research 
 
The CSSR is an umbrella organisation comprising five units:  
 
The Aids and Society Research Unit (ASRU) supports quantitative 
and qualitative research into the social and economic impact of 
the HIV pandemic in Southern Africa.  Focus areas include:  the 
economics of reducing mother to child transmission of HIV, the 
impact of HIV on firms and households; and psychological 
aspects of HIV infection and prevention.  ASRU operates an 
outreach programme in Khayelitsha (the Memory Box Project) 
which provides training and counselling for HIV positive people 
 
The Data First Resource Unit (‘Data First’) provides training and 
resources for research.  Its main functions are: 1) to provide 
access to digital data resources and specialised published 
material; 2) to facilitate the collection, exchange and use of data 
sets on a collaborative basis; 3) to provide basic and advanced 
training in data analysis; 4) the ongoing development of a web 
site to disseminate data and research output.    
 
The Democracy In Africa Research Unit (DARU) supports students 
and scholars who conduct systematic research in the following 
three areas:  1) public opinion and political culture in Africa and 
its role in democratisation and consolidation; 2) elections and 
voting in Africa; and 3) the impact of the HIV/AIDS pandemic on 
democratisation in Southern Africa. DARU has developed close 
working relationships with projects such as the Afrobarometer (a 
cross national survey of public opinion in fifteen African countries), 
the Comparative National Elections Project, and the Health 
Economics and AIDS Research Unit at the University of Natal. 
 
The Social Surveys Unit (SSU) promotes critical analysis of the 
methodology, ethics and results of South African social science 
research. One core activity is the Cape Area Panel Study of 
young adults in Cape Town.  This study follows 4800 young people 
as they move from school into the labour market and adulthood.  
The SSU is also planning a survey for 2004 on aspects of social 
capital, crime, and attitudes toward inequality. 
 
The Southern Africa Labour and Development Research Unit 
(SALDRU) was established in 1975 as part of the School of 
Economics and joined the CSSR in 2002.  SALDRU conducted the 
first national household survey in 1993 (the Project for Statistics on 
Living Standards and Development).  More recently, SALDRU ran 
the Langeberg Integrated Family survey (1999) and the 
Khayelitsha/Mitchell’s Plain Survey (2000).  Current projects 
include research on public works programmes, poverty and 
inequality.  
 
 
 
 
